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Abstract
One of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s responses to the global financial crisis
of 2007-09 was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that
evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30day stress scenario. One area in which this incentive has already resulted in changed
practices is in the market for commercial paper. Banks often provide backup liquidity
facilities to the issuers of commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a
maturing issue of commercial paper if they are unable to sell a new issue to do so. To avoid
such draws occurring within the 30-day LCR window, banks have developed commercial
paper that features a call provision enabling issuers to redeem the commercial paper prior
to the start of the window. This case considers the implications of the emergence of callable
commercial paper and whether this development introduces additional risk into the
financial system.
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related to Basel III. The other modules in this series are:
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Basel III A: Regulatory History
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Basel III C: Internal Risk Models
Basel III D: The Swiss Finish to Basel III
Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers
Basel III G: Shadow Banking and Project Finance
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1. Introduction
Looking back on the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) identified inadequate liquidity as one of the chief culprits in the crisis and determined
that something must be done to address it. As the BCBS has noted, “[d]uring the ‘liquidity
phase’ of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many banks—despite adequate capital
levels—still experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent
manner” (Bank for International Settlements 2013, 1). One of the BCBS’ two responses to
this failure was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that
evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30day stress scenario.
Under the LCR as proposed, a bank would determine the value of its stock of unencumbered
High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA—assets that can be easily and immediately converted into
cash at little or no loss of value) in stressed conditions. This figure is then divided by the
value of the total net cash outflows from the bank expected to occur over the next 30 calendar
days given the stressed conditions. The timeline established by the BCBS calls for banks to
achieve an LCR of 60% by January 1, 2015, and an LCR of 100% by January 1, 2019.
Once the LCR was implemented, banks would be required to maintain higher levels of HQLA
to cover expected outflows. The low returns HQLA provide have banks searching for ways to
reduce their expected outflows to avoid the profitability hit that could result. One area in
which this search has already resulted in changed practices is in the market for commercial
paper—short-term promissory notes issued by corporations and other issuers to fund
ongoing operations. Traditionally, banks provided backup liquidity facilities to the issuers of
commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a maturing issue of commercial
paper if they are unable to sell a new issue of commercial paper to do so. To avoid the
possibility of such draws occurring within the 30-day LCR window, banks have developed
commercial paper that features a call provision enabling issuers to redeem the commercial
paper prior to the start of the 30-day window. If all commercial paper is redeemed before it
reaches 30 days to maturity, then there is no possibility of a draw on the backup liquidity
facility within 30 days and no requirement under the LCR for the bank to maintain any HQLA
in support of the facility.
The emergence of callable commercial paper as a mechanism for avoiding the LCR raises
important questions about what the resulting risks are and whether the LCR as proposed
effectively addresses the liquidity concerns identified by the BCBS. It should also prompt
consideration of what additional mechanisms banks might use to circumvent the
requirements of Basel III.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the LCR. Section 3
provides an overview of the commercial paper market before discussing the emergence of
callable commercial paper in response to the LCR.
Questions
1. What are the implications of the emergence of callable commercial paper in response
to the LCR? Does this development introduce additional risk into the financial
system?
2. Are there other approaches banks could use to avoid the LCR and Basel III more
broadly?
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2. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio
The purpose of the LCR is to “promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile
of banks by ensuring that they have sufficient HQLA to survive a significant stress scenario
lasting 30 calendar days” (Bank for International Settlements 2013, 4). Underlying this 30day standard is the belief that by the 30th day of a stress scenario, bank management and
regulators will have had adequate time to take steps to address the situation, including
corrective actions by management and regulators, central bank intervention, or the orderly
resolution of particular banks (Ibid.). The LCR evaluates banks’ ability to survive to the 30th
day by comparing the stock of HQLA to the total net cash outflows anticipated over the 30
calendar days. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1: Basic LCR Formula

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2013, 7.

The LCR tests a stress scenario combining many of the shocks associated with the 2007-09
financial crisis. Among the outcomes assumed to result from these shocks are a run-off of
deposits and a partial loss of certain types of other funding, as well as increased outflows
stemming from credit downgrades and collateral posting requirements, unscheduled draws
on committed facilities, and the need to buy back debt and honor non-contractual obligations
to mitigate reputational risk. These assumptions guide the manner in which banks must
calculate their LCRs.
Calculating HQLA
To calculate their LCR, banks must first determine the size of their stock of unencumbered
HQLA. Under the LCR framework, “assets are considered to be HQLA if they can be easily and
immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of value” (Bank for International
Settlements 2013, 7). The stock of HQLA can include different categories of assets, with the
LCR calculation setting limits on and applying “haircuts” (discounts from the current market
value) to certain types of assets. (See Figure 2.)
Under the LCR framework, even assets fitting into the categories listed in Figure 2 must be
excluded from HQLA if they lack certain characteristics or fail to meet certain operational
requirements. Examples of the types of these additional considerations are that the assets
be low risk and have a low correlation with risky assets, that there be ease and certainty of
valuation, and that the assets be under the control of the function charged with managing
the liquidity of the bank. (For a complete discussion of how to calculate a bank’s stock of
HQLA, see pages 7 to 15 of Bank for International Settlements 2013.)
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Figure 2: HQLA Limits and Haircuts
Category

Level 1

•
•
•
•
•

Level 2

Level 2B
Note: Level 2B is
optional.
Regulators can
choose whether
or not to allow it
to be included in
the LCR
calculation

Limit (As % of
Total HQLA)

Assets Included

•

•

•
•

Coins and bank notes
Central bank reserves
Certain marketable securities with
a 0% Basel II risk-weight and a
record of liquidity
Certain sovereign or central bank
debt securities with a non-0%
Basel II risk-weight
Certain marketable securities with
a 20% Basel II risk-weight and a
record of liquidity
Certain corporate debt securities
and covered bonds with a rating of
AA- or higher and a record of
liquidity
Certain residential mortgage
backed securities with a rating of
AA or higher and a record of
liquidity
Certain corporate debt securities
with a rating between A+ and BBBand a record of liquidity
Certain common equity shares
with a record of liquidity

“Haircut”
Applied

No limit

0%

40%
(including
Level 2B)

15% of
current
market value

15%

25% to 50%
of current
market value

Source: Project Editor Notes.
Calculating Total Net Cash Outflows
After determining their stock of HQLA as the first step of the LCR calculation, banks must
then calculate the total net cash outflows that would be expected to occur in a 30-day stress
scenario using the approach in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Calculating Net Cash Outflows

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2013, 20.

To calculate total expected cash outflows, banks multiply the outstanding amounts of various
types of liabilities and commitments by an expected run-off rate designated for each liability
or commitment type by the BCBS. For example, retail deposits covered by typical deposit
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insurance have an expected run-off rate of 5%, reflecting the belief of the BCBS that
approximately 5% of such deposits will be withdrawn in a 30-day stress scenario. A bank
with $100 million in retail deposits covered by deposit insurance would thus include $5
million in the calculation of total expected cash outflows stemming from such retail deposits.
The expected run-off rates range from 3% for retail deposits covered by deposit insurance
meeting certain enhanced criteria to 100% for other, less stable sources of funding like
maturing secured-funding transactions not backed by HQLA.
Banks must also include other potential sources of cash outflows, including increased
liquidity needs related to credit downgrades and collateral calls and drawdowns on
committed lending facilities. Particularly relevant in the context of commercial paper are the
requirements on liquidity facilities. Under the LCR framework, the portion of a commercial
paper backup liquidity facility subject to the calculation is equal to the amount of currently
outstanding debt backstopped by the facility that matures within 30 days. This amount is
then multiplied by an expected drawdown rate to determine the extent of the total expected
cash outflow. Expected drawdown rates for liquidity facilities range from 5% for retail and
small business clients to 100% for financial institutions.
The calculation of total cash inflows, in turn, requires that banks look only to contractual
inflows (including interest payments) from fully performing exposures for which there is no
expectation of default during the 30-day window. When considering maturing secured
lending transactions, banks must apply an expected inflow rate to determine how much cash
is projected to come in as a result of the maturing transaction. For example, a maturing
reverse repurchase agreement secured by Level 1 HQLA is expected to be rolled over,
resulting in no cash returned to the lending bank. A maturing reverse repurchase agreement
secured by non-HQLA assets is assumed not to be rolled over, resulting in the return of 100%
of the cash associated with the agreement. The resulting calculation of total expected cash
inflows is then subject to a cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows to prevent banks from
relying entirely on expected cash inflows to meet their liquidity needs. (For a complete
discussion of how to calculate a bank’s total net cash outflows, see pages 20 to 37 of Bank for
International Settlements 2013. For an illustrative summary of the LCR calculation, see
Annex 4 of Bank for International Settlements 2013. (For an overview of the Net Stable
Funding Ratio, the other liquidity measure introduced by Basel III, see YPFS Case Study
McNamara, et al. 2014G. For a complete summary of Basel III, see YPFS Case Study
McNamara, et al. 2014B.)

3. Callable Commercial Paper
Commercial paper is typically defined to include short-term promissory notes issued by
corporations and other issuers to fund ongoing operations, with commercial paper divided
into one of three categories based on the issuer: asset-backed, financial, and corporate. In
the United States, there is approximately $1 trillion in commercial paper outstanding at a
given time, down from an estimated $2 trillion outstanding at times prior to the start of the
crisis in 2007. As of January 2007, the U.S. market for commercial paper was comprised of
approximately 60% asset-backed commercial paper, 34% financial commercial paper, and
6% corporate commercial paper (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010, 32).
In the United States, most commercial paper has a maturity of 270 days or less due to
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 exempting debt instruments with initial maturities
under nine months from registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
According to the Federal Reserve, the average maturity for commercial paper is
approximately 30 days. Many issuers repay maturing commercial paper using the proceeds
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of a new issuance of paper in a process known as “rolling over.” An inability to roll over
maturing commercial paper because of changed market conditions, issuer difficulties, etc. is
thus one of the major threats facing issuers and purchasers of commercial paper.
Although turmoil in the commercial paper market is relatively rare, the risk of being unable
to roll over maturing commercial paper has proven very real in recent financial history. In
1970 Penn Central, a major American railroad company, declared bankruptcy and defaulted
on its commercial paper. During the days following the bankruptcy filing, investors,
concerned that other issuers might also default, fled the commercial paper market, resulting
in a 10% decline in nonbank paper outstanding (Stojanovic & Vaughan 1998). This
prevented many issuers from rolling over maturing commercial paper and threatened to
leave them without the liquidity to meet their obligations. In response, the Federal Reserve
took a number of steps intended to promote bank lending to issuers unable to roll over
maturing commercial paper, including opening the discount window and increasing the
open market purchase of securities to boost the money supply.
A similar situation occurred more recently when, upon the initial signs of the subprime
mortgage crisis in 2007 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the size of the markets
for asset-backed commercial paper and all commercial paper respectively contracted
significantly as issuers were no longer able to roll over maturing issuances. The resulting
loss of liquidity prompted aggressive intervention by the Federal Reserve in the form of,
among other things, direct purchases of commercial paper. (For a more detailed discussion
of the role of commercial paper during the global financial crisis of 2007-09, see Kacperczyk
and Schnabl 2010.)
Given the risk that they won’t be able to roll over maturing commercial paper, non-financial
issuers typically maintain backup liquidity facilities with banks that enable them to borrow
money to fund repayment. Ratings agencies usually look for these backup liquidity facilities
to be in the form of committed facilities with same-day liquidity availability equal to or in
excess of the maximum amount of commercial paper maturing on any given day. In the event
that issuers are unable to roll over maturing commercial paper, banks offering backup
liquidity facilities might thus find themselves having to provide significant amounts of cash
under the facilities. (For examples of ratings agencies’ requirements for backup liquidity
facilities, see A.M. Best Company 2012 and DBRS 2012.)
Significantly, a backup facility backstopping commercial paper with 30 days or less to
maturity could be drawn upon during the 30-day window subject to the LCR, requiring the
facility provider to maintain corresponding HQLA. Given the cost to banks of maintaining
HQLA rather than other assets, the effect of the LCR is thus to increase the cost to banks of
providing backup liquidity facilities for commercial paper maturing in 30 days or less.
In response, bankers have developed commercial paper that features a call provision
enabling issuers to redeem the commercial paper prior to maturity. Often this is
accomplished by creating a “call exercise period” (many times beginning 35 days prior to
maturity and extending through the date before maturity) during which the issuer may
redeem the commercial paper. To incentivize issuers to make redemptions before reaching
the 30-day LCR window and to offset the additional LCR-related cost of providing backup
liquidity facilities if they do not, banks include in their backup facilities a surcharge for any
commercial paper that remains outstanding during the 30-day period. A typical provision,
taken from a municipal commercial paper offering in Florida, provides for a 0.75% per
annum surcharge for each day that the commercial paper remains outstanding during the
period beginning 30 days prior to maturity. Issuers often explicitly declare in commercial
paper offering documents that they intend to avoid this surcharge by exercising the
redemption option prior to the 30-day window. For example, the commercial paper
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memorandum for the Florida municipal offering states “[t]o avoid such surcharge, the Issuer
anticipates entering into a standing order with each Dealer (the ‘Standing Order’), subject to
certain conditions, to facilitate a redemption on the earliest possible Business Day within
each Call Exercise Period” (Sunshine State Governmental Financing Commission 2013, 6).
(To review the relevant provisions of a callable commercial paper issuance, see pages 3
through 9 and 14 through 16 of Sunshine State Governmental Financing Commission 2013.)
Given banks’ incentive to avoid the LCR window, there is evidence that they have been
aggressively promoting callable commercial paper to the issuers for whom they provide
backup liquidity. For example, in 2012, JP Morgan approached the City of Los Angeles about
amending one of its existing commercial paper programs so that the City could issue callable
commercial paper on a pilot basis. In exchange, JP Morgan offered the City a reduction in the
utilization fee charged for a portion of its backup facility (from 1.25% to 0.90%) and
reimbursement of all legal fees and ratings fees associated with the implementation of
callable commercial paper. (For a summary of JP Morgan’s proposal and the City’s
consideration of it, see Council of the City of Los Angeles Budget and Finance Committee
2013.)

Figure 4: The Timeline Associated with a Typical Callable Commercial Paper Transaction

Source: JP Morgan 2012.

Having accepted JP Morgan’s proposal, on October 11, 2012, Los Angeles sold $37.75 million
in callable commercial paper at an interest rate of 0.22%, a 0.02% premium to the City’s
traditional commercial paper (City of Los Angeles Office of the City Administrative Officer
2013, 54).
Debate on Callable Commercial Paper and LCR
No clear consensus has emerged to date on the significance of callable commercial paper’s
introduction. On the one hand, it is possible to see callable commercial paper as a textbook
example of regulatory arbitrage in which banks have developed a new product intended to
circumvent Basel III’s push to ensure adequate liquidity. Prior to a shift toward callable
commercial paper, a bank providing backup liquidity facilities to issuers of commercial
paper would presumably have at least some of the issuances it backstops within the 30-day
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LCR window at any given time. This would require the bank to maintain at least some level
of HQLA support for its backup liquidity facilities. An across-the-board shift to callable
commercial paper, if accompanied by consistent redemption prior to the 30-day window,
would mean that no HQLA would have to be maintained. In the event of another financial
crisis in which issuers became unable to roll over their commercial paper, the bank, despite
having maintained no HQLAs in support of its backup liquidity facilities, could be called upon
to provide significant amounts of cash pursuant to those facilities.
On the other hand, one might alternatively see callable commercial paper as an appropriate
response in keeping with the fundamental premise of the LCR—that by the 31st day of a
crisis, bank management and regulators will have had the opportunity to effectively respond.
According to this view, the development of callable commercial paper is an innovation that
prudently allows banks to push all cash outflows associated with backup liquidity facilities
beyond the 30-day period identified by the BCBS as the window of concern. Banks would not
have any corresponding HQLA to call upon in a crisis scenario, but no outflows from the bank
would occur for at least 31 days (significantly, backup liquidity facilities for callable
commercial paper are generally specifically structured so that they cannot be used by issuers
for redemptions, meaning that outflows would only occur on actual maturity). If critics of
callable commercial paper nonetheless remain concerned about its implications, it would
suggest that what they are really uncomfortable with is the very 30-day timeframe that is
the foundation of the LCR.
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Appendix 1: Summary of the Main IFRS 9 Impairment Proposals

Source: BDO 2013, 24.
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